| Editorial Note: The writing below was part of a report drafted by Dr. Michael A. Weinstein. The full report can be found at www.pinr.com website |
The strongest military power in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has the most
direct and intense interest in Somalia of any external actor. To the west of
Somalia's long border with Ethiopia lies the latter's Ogaden region, with a
predominantly ethnic Somali population of four million people. In 1977, Somalia
invaded Ogaden in order to annex it and create a Greater Somali state. Ethiopia
won the ensuing war at considerable cost, but since then has faced a persistent
insurgency.
With the rise of the I.C.C., some elements of which are
irredentist, Addis Ababa fears with good reason that the insurgency could become
more effective. Addis Ababa considers preservation of sovereignty over Ogaden to
be a vital interest, which is the basis for its moves into Somalia to defend the
T.F.G. and curb the I.C.C.'s drive west.
Ethiopia is also involved in a
simmering border dispute with Eritrea, with which it fought a brutal war in the
1990s. Since then, Addis Ababa and Asmara have massed troops on their border,
and Asmara has sought to undermine Addis Ababa in the region. The ascent of the
I.C.C. has provided an opportunity for Asmara to create an anti-Ethiopian
alliance, and Asmara has reportedly been a conduit for and supplier of weapons
to the Courts and, according to Addis Ababa, to the insurgent Ogaden National
Liberation Front (O.N.L.F.).
Although it is far larger and more populous
and well-endowed militarily than its neighbors in the Horn, Ethiopia is riven by
strife among its many ethnic groups, religiously divided between Muslims and
Christians -- each comprising approximately 45 percent of its population --
governed by an increasingly authoritarian and unpopular regime that has played
divide and rule among ethnic groups, and faced with an opposition that has begun
to coalesce and that it has attempted to repress. In addition to the O.N.L.F.
insurgency, the government confronts a similar situation in the Oromia region,
where the Oromo Liberation Front (O.L.F.) fights a persistent guerrilla war and
has joined with the O.N.L.F. and other ethnic factions in the opposition
Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (A.F.D.).
Supported by Washington,
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is faced with too many problems to be a reliable
proxy for Washington's attempt to roll back the rise of Islamism in Somalia.
Ethiopia is currently in a cycle of instability, which is likely to deepen and
impede Addis Ababa from undertaking a full-scale intervention into Somalia.
Zenawi will, however, do whatever he can to contain the I.C.C. and tamp down the
O.N.L.F.
During the first two weeks of August, Zenawi responded to an
uptick in O.N.L.F. activity, fueled by the I.C.C.'s successes and possible
support from the I.C.C. and Asmara, by ordering a "military sweep" in Ogaden on
August 6 to suppress the insurgency. Zenawi claimed that peace talks to which
both sides had agreed had broken down after discussions in the United States and
Europe between local clan elders and O.N.L.F. leaders had failed to produce
progress. Zenawi claimed that the "sweep" was requested by the
elders.
The O.N.L.F. responded on August 7, stating that Addis Ababa's
military action was nothing out of the ordinary and that Zenawi had announced it
to reassure foreign hydrocarbon companies bidding on a gas contract in Ogaden
that Addis Ababa was in control of the region. Indeed, the O.N.L.F. claimed that
it had conducted extensive military exercises throughout the region that
Ethiopian forces had been unable to prevent. On August 10, the O.N.L.F.'s
leader, Admiral Mohamed Omar Osman refused to deny support from the I.C.C. and
Asmara, saying that "any group that supports our cause is a friend." He blamed
Addis Ababa for derailing peace talks by refusing to hold them in a neutral
country and accept an independent mediator.
On August 10, Ethiopia's
Ministry of Mines and Energy awarded the Malaysian oil company Petronas with a
contract to develop the Calub and Hilala natural gas fields in the Ogaden.
Petronas agreed to invest US$1.9 billion in the project and to build a refinery
and a pipeline to Djibouti. The O.N.L.F. immediately reissued its warning to
Petronas that Addis Ababa is not in effective control of Ogaden and "is not in a
position to issue licenses," adding that it would not permit the company to
exploit the resources and declaring that Ogaden is a "conflict zone."
The
conflict spiked on August 11 when Addis Ababa reported that its troops had
killed 13 O.N.L.F. insurgents as they crossed the border from Somalia and had
captured their commanders. The O.N.L.F. did not deny the deaths, but claimed
that none of its officers had been captured, accusing Addis Ababa of lying to
reassure Petronas. On August 16, the O.N.L.F. claimed that its forces had killed
120 Ethiopian troops and wounded 141 on August 7, and had killed 16 Ethiopian
forces and wounded 20 on August 12.
As tensions in Ogaden rose, Addis
Ababa suffered its first serious military defection, when Brigadier General
Kemal Geltu, an Oromo, and more than 150 soldiers and officers sought refuge in
Eritrea. Geltu announced that he had joined the O.L.F. to fight for Oromo
rights; Addis Ababa said that he was disgruntled because he had been passed over
for promotion.
The instability of the Zenawi government and the pressures
on it not only limit its room to maneuver in Somalia, but also throw Ogaden into
play and raise the risks for Petronas, which is aggressively seeking new
reserves as the ones under its control are depleted. Addis Ababa is under duress
from within and without, and faces greater challenges in the wake of the
I.C.C.'s ascent. It is not clear that Zenawi can afford a major military
operation in Somalia, especially as Ogaden becomes a more intense "conflict
zone." Addis Ababa is approaching its limits and is likely to engage in a
testing game with the I.C.C.